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BARNEY V. THE SAN DIEGO CHICKEN

Lyons Partnership, the owners of the popular purple dinosaur
character Barney, took legal action in late October against Ted
Giannoulas who performs as the famous chicken mascot of the San
Diego Padres. The copyright and trademark infringement lawsuit
stems from the use of a Barney-like character by the defendant
during his performances in which the purple dinosaur character is
ridiculed and assaulted.
As the federal lawsuit filed by Lyons specifically alleges, The
Famous Chicken "would punch, flip, stand on and otherwise
assault the putatitve Barney." This suit follows not only an initial
notification by Lyons to Giannoulas that his actions constituted
both copyright and trademark infringement, but also numerous
cease-and-desist letters. As Bamey's consumer base consists
primarily of young children, Barney's owners are particularly
concerned that their young audience is not sophisticated enough to
recognize the difference between the abused character in the
Famous Chicken performances and the authentic Barney. Lyons is
seeking a permanent injunction against the further use of the purple
dinosaur character by Giannoulas in addition to $100,000 for each
of the Giannoulas performances that featured the Barney-like
character.
Mr. Giannoulas has asserted, in his defense, that his actions
constitute nothing more than a parody which is clearly protected
under the Copyright Act, the First Amendment and trademark
laws. In addition, he claims that his parody featuring the purple
dinosaur character is but a small part of his performance. While
the dinosaur featured in The Famous Chicken performances clearly
resembles the Barney character, Mr. Giannoulas maintains that his
creation is substantially different from Bamey, "My character has
scales, not spots, it has no toenails and its head isn't quite as big."
Mr. Giannoulas insists that while this lawsuit by Lyons is
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disturbing, it will not stand in his way - he plans to continue to take
his shots at the purple dinosaur. One Chicken Loses His Head at
Sight of Purple Dinosaur - Barney Owners Take Action Against
San Diego Mascot For Beatings in His Skit, WALL ST. J.,
November 7, 1997; Frank Green, Famous Performing Bird Sued
By Owner of Barney Character, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRiB.
November 5, 1997.

No PROTECTION FOR PUBLISHER OF "HIT MAN" BOOK
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently ruled
that the First Amendment does not preclude a finding of civil
liability in a wrongful death action brought against a publisher of a
hit-man manual. This "unique" case, as described by the court,
involved a convicted killer's use of the publisher's hit-man manual
in the murders of three people. The convicted hit man, James
Perry, was hired by Lawrence Horn to kill his ex-wife,
quadriplegic son and his son's nurse in an effort to collect his son's
$2 million settlement which he had received as the result of an
accident that left him paralyzed. Paladin Press' Hit Man: A
Technical Manualfor Independent Contractorswas relied heavily
upon by Perry in the commission of the triple murders as it
provided detailed instructions on how to commit murder and how
to become a professional killer. As a result, the victims' families
brought a wrongful death action against Paladin Press for its
involvement in the deaths of their loved ones.
The Fourth Circuit's decision reverses the lower court's findings
that Paladin Press was not liable for wrongful death as the book did
not reach the level of incitement to "imminent lawless action" and
was, therefore, protected under Brandenburgv. Ohio. In reversing
summary judgment for Paladin and remanding for trial the court
looked to two aspects of this particular case - the criminal intent of
the defendant publisher and the incitement to murder that the
manual constituted.
The court insisted that the First Amendment does not stand in
the way of a finding of civil or criminal liability for speech acts by
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/14
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the plaintiff which can be shown to have been committed with
specific and perhaps criminal intent. Essential to the court's
finding that the speech in question was outside the protection of the
First Amendment, as it constituted criminal aiding and abetting,
was a joint stipulation by both parties. In this stipulation, the
publisher stated that the book "assisted Perry in the perpetration of
the murders," and "that it provided its assistance to Perry with both
the knowledge and the intent that the book would immediately be
used by criminals and would-be criminals in the solicitation,
planning, and commission of murder and murder for hire."
Additionally, the court foind that Paladin's manual went far
beyond the abstract advocacy theory protected under Brandenburg.
Rather, the court found that the book in question possessed, "little,
if anything, even remotely characterizable as the abstract criticism
that Brandenburgzealously protects."
The court also addressed the many concerns that a decision such
as this would result in widespread liability for publishers,
broadcasters and the media industry as a whole. The court found
this case to be particularly unique in that it is rare that such a
specific intent to aid criminality would exist as it did here. Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (Nov. 10, 1997); CA 4
Finds "HitMan" Book Does Not Merit Protection,MED. L. RPTR.
44 (1997).

FOURTH CIRCUIT TO ADDRESS WHETHER CLAIM IS PREEMPTED
UNDER CDA
Plaintiff Zeran recently argued before the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals that the district court erred when it excused America
Online from liability for defamatory messages posted on its
electronic bulletin boards. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia's ruling was based on their interpretation of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The district court
agreed with the argument posed by AOL that the suit filed by
Zeran was preempted by Section 230 of the CDA which
establishes that computer services are not to be treated as
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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publishers of material posted on their systems by third parties. In
finding that the CDA applied retroactively, the district court
dismissed Zeran's complaint against AOL.
Zeran's complaint alleging that AOL negligently allowed
defamatory messages to remain on its system, even though they
were well aware of their offending content, stems from the
following circumstances. An unidentified AOL user known only
as "Ken Z033" began posting, shortly after the bombing of the
Oklahoma City federal building, messages which advertised Tshirts featuring slogans glorifying the tragic bombing. These
messages not only listed Mr. Zeran's name but also his telephone
number. Consequently, Mr. Zeran began receiving a barrage of
threatening and harassing phone calls. Mr. Zeran, however, was
unable to change his phone number for business reasons. Instead,
Mr. Zeran complained to AOL and insisted that the message be
removed. Although the message was removed, numerous similar
messages continued to appear. Mr. Zeran, therefore, claims that
the CDA does not preclude interactive computer service providers
from liability when they did nothing to block, edit or screen
offending messages of which they had previously been made
aware. 4th Cir.Hears Arguments in Appeal of Preemption Ruling
for AOL, COMPUTER AND ONLINE INDUSTRY LR, p.7, October 7,
1997; AOL Tells 4th Cir. To Affirm Ruling that Claim Is
Preempted Under CDA, COMPUTER AND ONLINE INDUSTRY LR,
p.9, October 21, 1997.

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

SOUND
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California decided that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, 18 USC 2252 ("CPPA") is constitutional. The CPPA
prevents the use of computer technology to produce sexually
explicit materials which convey the impression that minors were
used in the images. The CPPA was challenged by a trade
association that defends First Amendment rights against
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/14
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censorship, a book publisher, and individual artists whose works
include erotic paintings and photographs. The plaintiffs argued
that the CPPA was content-based, overbroad, vague and
constituted a prior restraint on speech, therefore it was in
contravention of the First Amendment.
The court held that the contested provisions of the CPPA were
not content-based. It reasoned that due to the nature of the evils
that anti-child pornography laws are intended to prevent, the CPPA
could easily be interpreted as content-neutral. The CPPA, aimed at
the devastating secondary effects of child pornography, was a
justified regulation of such speech.
The court also held that the CPPA was neither overbroad nor
vague. As to overbreadth, the CPPA specified only materials that
do not use adults and that appear to be child pornography, even if
they are digitally produced, are prohibited. Thus only those works
which promote the secondary pernicious effects of child
pornography are prohibited. As to vagueness, the court held that
the CPPA gives sufficient guidance to persons of reasonable
intelligence about what it prohibits. So long as the person
portrayed in the work is an adult, the work is not marketed as child
pornography and it does not convey the impression it is child
pornography, the CPPA's affirmative defenses protect the work.
Finally, the court concluded that because the CPPA does not
require advance approval for production or distribution of
exempted pornography, and does not effectively ban
constitutionally protected material, it is not a prior restraint on
speech. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 25 MED. L. RPTR. 2305
(DC Calif. 1997).

NiNTH CICUIT MAKES CLINT EASTWOOD'S DAY

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a judgment awarding actor/director Clint Eastwood
damages for an Enquirerarticle based on an interview which never
took place. The jury awarded Eastwood $150,000 because it
determined that Eastwood's fans would think he was: 1) a
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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hypocrite for giving an exclusive interview to a tabloid newspaper;
and 2) essentially washed up as a movie star if he was appearing
willingly in a sensationalist tabloid newspaper. The trial court
awarded Eastwood $653,156 in attorney's fees, but declined to
award him $185,163 in costs.
The case stemmed from the Enquirer's December 21, 1993
issue, which included a bold headline proclaiming an exclusive
interview with Eastwood. In response to the article, which
included alleged direct quotes from Eastwood, as well as scenesetting phrases such as "Eastwood said with a chuckle," Eastwood
filed a claim against the tabloid for misrepresentation of origin,
association, and/or endorsement in violation of the Lanham Act,
invasion of privacy, and misappropriation of name, likeness and
personality under Calif. Civ. Code Section 3344. In upholding the
jury's verdict and finding the actual malice standard to be met, the
appellate court determined that the editors of the tabloid intended
to convey the impression, which they knew to be false, that
Eastwood willfully submitted to an interview with the Enquirer.
Eastwood v. National Enquirer Inc., 25 MD. L. RPTR. 2198 (CA 9
1997).

NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS NOT UNDER THE LANHAM ACT

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia held that dissemination of information by People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals ("PETA") about a laboratory owned
by Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. ("Huntingdon") was not
commercial speech as defined under the Lanham Act. Therefore,
the court dismissed Huntingdon's Lanham Act claims.
The action arose out of PETA employee Michelle Rokke's
Rokke sought
temporary employment with Huntingdon.
employment at Huntingdon as part of an undercover investigation
After Rokke resigned from
of animal testing practices.
Huntingdon, PETA issued press releases, participated in interviews
and released videotapes taken by Rokke in an effort to attack
Huntingdon's animal testing practices. Huntingdon asserted that
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/14
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PETA published false and disparaging statements in connection
with the disclosure of trade secrets and proprietary information,
and that those such statements were advertising or promotion
prohibited by the Lanham Act.
The court agreed with PETA that the Lanham Act is not to be
used as a means to stifle criticism of a consumer advocate who is
not engaged in marketing or promoting a competitive product or
service. The court concluded that PETA's intent in publishing the
information about Huntingdon's laboratory was to disseminate a
political message against cruelty to animals, not to advance
economically to the detriment of Huntingdon. Huntingdon Life
Sciences, Inc. v. Rokke, No. CIV.2:97CV597, 1997 WL 594894
(E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 1997).

INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE MERELY INTERMEDIARIES

The Florida Circuit Court in Palm Beach County ruled that an
Internet service provider is not liable for violating a Florida law
which prohibits the sale or distribution of obscene material, or for
negligence based on a convicted child pornographer's use of on of
the provider's chat rooms to offer for sale indecent pictures of
minors. It relied on the premise that Internet service providers are
not to be viewed as traditional publishers or speakers of
information. The suit was brought by the father of an eleven-yearold boy who had been videotaped and photographed performing
sexual activities, against America Online, Inc. ("AOL") and AOL
subscriber Richard Russell. The videos and photographs of the
plaintiff's son were never transmitted over defendant AOL's
service, rather they were described and then advertised for sale by
defendant Russell in an AOL chat room.
The court held that the plaintiffs claims were barred by Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which
the court found by the statute's express language to preempt state
law. That statute states in pertinent part that "[n]o provider.., of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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content provider," and that "[n]o cause of action may be brought
and no liability imposed under any state or local law that is
inconsistent with this section." Making AOL liable for one of its
subscriber's chat room conversations would, contrary to the
express purpose of the statute, treat AOL as a publisher for three
reasons. First, it would impose upon AOL the same legal
ramifications as the actual speaker of the communication, in this
case Russell. Second, it would treat AOL more like a newspaper
than a telephone company, who like AOL provides a service over
which numerous third parties may communicate. Finally, it would
impose on AOL as a matter of law the burden of monitoring and
censoring great volumes of information which is transmitted by
third parties. Doe v. America Online, Inc.25 MED. L. RPTR. 2112
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. 1997).

ARTIST MAY RECLAIM PAINTINGS

A five-judge panel of New York's Appellate Division, First
Department, reversed a lower court's grant of summary judgment
which would have denied 85-year-old Agnes Martin recovery of
dozens of her own paintings. Martin, an artist renowned for her
abstract artwork, entered into a bailment agreement for the storage
of her paintings in 1967 with Arthur and Lois Blood, acquaintances
of Martin. The bailment agreement provided that Martin would
allow the Bloods to reside in her Manhattan loft for the balance of
her lease, and in exchange the Bloods would store Martin's
paintings until she demanded their return. In 1988, the paintings
were allegedly given as a gift by Lois Blood to her daughters, who
then consigned the paintings to Sotheby's.
The question presented to the court was whether Martin, after 28
years, still enjoyed ownership rights in the paintings, now worth an
estimated $1.4 million. The defendants essentially argued that the
bailment agreement ended upon the death of Mr. Blood, that
Martin's delay was unreasonable, and that Martin's claims were
barred by both statute of limitations and laches.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/14
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In reversing the lower court's order granting summary judgment,
the court held that genuine issues of material fact existed: as to
whether Mrs. Blood and her daughters acted as bailees; as to the
reasonableness of Martin's delay; and as to whether a laches
defense could successfully be presented. The court also gave
Martin leave to amend her complaint. In coming to its conclusion,
the court relied on the fact that the bailment was for an indefinite
period of time. The court also noted that the Mr. Blood, Mrs.
Blood and the daughters did not act wholly inconsistent with the
bailment contract until one daughter consigned the paintings to
Sothby's. Arguably, the court contended, Martin made her
demands within a reasonable time of this inconsistent act. Martin
v. Briggs, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (1997).

JAPANESE PHRASE IS A PROTECTED AMERICAN TRADEMARK

A federal judge in New York held that the Japanese phrase
"otokoyama" is a valid trademark for the Japanese alcoholic
beverage sake, and granted a preliminary injunction against a New
York-based wine distributor.
Plaintiff Otokoyama Co. has
distributed and sold sake under the name "Otokoyama" since 1984.
Plaintiff filed suit when it learned that Wine of Japan Import, Inc.
was advertising and distributing sake under the brand name "Mutsu
Otokoyama." The case was brought for trademark infringement,
unfair competition, and false designation of origin, as well as
additional state claims.
Defendant first argued that the trademark was invalid, because
plaintiff obtained the mark by falsely claiming the phrase could not
be translated into English. Literally translated, otokoyama is a
combination of the words "man" and "mountain," though in Japan
it does refer to an ancient type of dry sake. The court rejected that
argument, and then proceeded to examine the eight likelihood of
confusion factors: strength of the mark; similarity of the marks;
proximity of the products; bridging the gap; actual confusion;
defendant's good faith; quality of the products; and sophistication
of consumers. The court determined that the eight factors weighed
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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heavily in plaintiffs favor. Furthermore, the court emphasized that
to deny the injunction would cause undue hardship to plaintiffs
reputation, a reputation that took thirteen years to establish.
Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc. 45 U.S.P.Q.
1194 (1997).

AVON'S ADVERTISEMENTS ARE NOT FALSE

A New York District Judge held that Avon Products, Inc.'s SkinSo-Soft advertisements were neither false nor misleading under the
Lanham Act. This decision brought to a close litigation between
plaintiff Avon Products Inc. and defendant S.C. Johnson and Son,
Inc. that had been ongoing since 1994. At the heart of this most
recent trial was defendant's claim that the plaintiff falsely
promoted its Skin-So-Soft bath oil as an insect repellent, so as to
deprive defendant of profits. Defendant had sought $76 million in
damages.
The court, after an exhaustive explanation of various consumer
surveys and studies, concluded plaintiff was aware consumers used
the product as an insect repellent due to a belief that Skin-So-Soft
was an insect repellent. However, the court found that while the
Avon Products, Inc. may have sought to exploit that belief, it did
not expressly market the product as an Environmental Protection
Agency approved insect repellent. The court concluded that
primary source of the consumer's perception regarding Skin-SoSoft was word of mouth rather than actual marketing efforts by the
plaintiff. The court found support in its determination that
plaintiffs advertisement's were not false or misleading in studies
showing Skin-So-Soft did indeed have some effectiveness as an
insect repellent against certain flies and gnats. The court denied
the defendant's claim based on the aforementioned reasons, and in
the alternative based on the fact that defendant waited too long to
assert claims that could have been raised as early as the mid1980's. Avon Products, Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. 1997 WL
725971 (S.D.N.Y.).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/14
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MAYOR LOSES PUBLICITY BATTLE WITH MAGAZINE

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York declared that Mayor Giuliani's right to control the use
of his name for commercial purposes must yield to New York
Magazine's free-speech claim. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin granted
a preliminary injunction sought by the magazine which forced the
City and the Metropolitan Transit Authority to fulfill an $85,000
contract to run an ad on 75 buses reading: New York Magazine
"Possibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't taken
credit for."
Judge Scheindlin granted the injunction based on two
preliminary findings which lead to her ultimate determination that
the magazine would prevail on its free-speech claim. Initially, she
held the ad was combination of commercial speech and political
satire, and thus entitled only to limited free-speech protections.
Next, she found the outside surfaces of the city buses to be public
forums where restrictions on speech, including commercial speech,
must pass the four-part test established in Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
In holding that the City did not meet the Hudson test, Judge
Scheindlin noted that the magazine prevailed on the first prong
because they are not misleading and address lawful activity.
Furthermore, she found that the City did not satisfy the remaining
three prongs requiring: an asserted substantial governmental
interest; restrictions that advance that interest; and restrictions that
are narrowly tailored.
The City argued it had met the substantial interest prong for two
reasons. First, it asserted there was a need to prevent any possible
conflicts of interest arising from a public servant's use of his name
to promote a private business. Second, it claimed a need to follow
New York Civil Rights Law § 50 which bars the use, without
consent, of a person's name or picture for commercial purposes.
Judge Scheindlin rejected both arguments. With respect to the
conflict of interests claim, she found that it was clear from the ad
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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that Mayor Giuliani was not endorsing the product, therefore, no
conflict was present. Additionally, she found that the ad not only
promoted interest in the for-profit entity, but also contained humor
and satire from which all New Yorkers benefit. Judge Scheindlin
found the Civil Rights Law inapplicable. She pointed out that a
person in Mayor Giuliani's position had a very limited expectation
of privacy. Furthermore, she held the New York Magazine ads to
fit within exceptions of § 50. New York Magazine v. Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 97 Civ. 8792 (Deborah Pines, Court Blocks
Mayor's Bid to Block Bus Ads, N.Y.L. JOURNAL, December 2,

1997.

BOOK AND SEXUAL STATUS OF ELVIS'

EX-WIFE LEAD TO Two

SUITS

Priscilla Beaulieu has always maintained that she was a virgin
when she married Elvis Presley. However, a new book by Suzanne
Finstad, "Child Bride: The Untold Story of Priscilla Beaulieu
Presley," is now the source of two multimillion-dollar lawsuits set
for trial in May.
Ms. Presley is suing Lavern Currie Grant, a former friend of Mr.
Presley, for his statements appearing in the book that claim he had
sexual relations with her while she was under age and before she
met and married Mr. Presley.
In the defamation suit, Ms. Presley is seeking damages in the
amount of at least $10 million for injury to her entertainment
career, reputation and peace of mind. She alleges that Mr. Grant
was a "groupie" who has stalked and harassed her since 1959. Her
suit also claims that Mr. Grant was desperate for money and
invented this story of lies and innuendo in the hopes of gaining
notoriety and reaping monetary benefits.
Mr. Grant, however, filed his own defamation suit based on
statements that Ms. Presley made which appear in the same book.
His suit, in which he is seeking at least $5 million in damages, Mr.
Grant disputes Ms. Presley's statements that he tried to rape her
repeatedly throughout the 1950's.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/14
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Both litigants claim that they were mortified and suffered
emotional distress due to the other's statements. Neither lawsuit
named the author. Elvis Pal Claims Mrs. Presley Was Not a
Virgin, So She Sues, NAT'L L. J., October 13, 1997 at A31.

NINTH CIRCUIT SAYS SPIRITS AND HUMANS COLLABORATED TO
CREATE COPYRIGHTED WORK

The Urantia Foundation as plaintiff-appellant claimed that
defendant-appellee Kristen Maaherra infringed the Foundation's
copyright of the Urantia Book when she distributed the full text of
the Book on a computer disk. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the United States
District Court of Arizona which had granted summary judgment to
Maaherra on the ground that the Foundation's copyright renewal
was invalid.
The Urantia Book was "created" by a small group of humans
called the Contact Commission. This group and Maaherra both
claim that the Book was "authored" by non-human spiritual beings.
Allegedly, these spirits communicated the material for the Book
'through" one of the members of the Contact Commission. The
Contact Commission, along with a larger group of followers called
the Forum, asked the spirits certain questions, the answers to which
were transmitted to the humans. The answers were organized by
the humans and became a manuscript called the Urantia Papers.
The Papers made up the text of the Book and were intentionally
destroyed after the creation of 2,000 printing plates.
The Contact Commission created a charitable trust called the
Urantia Foundation to preserve and disseminate the teachings of
the Papers. The Foundation published the Book in 1955, received
the original copyright certificate in 1956 and renewed the
copyright in 1983. In 1991, the Foundation filed suit after it
discovered that Maaherra had prepared a study aid which included
the entire text of the Book on computer disks with the
Foundation's trademarks.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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For a work to qualify for copyright protection it must be original
and possess some minimal level of creativity. Maaherra claimed
that the book lacked the obligatory trait of human creativity since it
was created by spirits and, therefore, could not be properly
copyrighted. The Ninth Circuit agreed with her, noting that an
earthly being could only be guilty of copyright infringement if it
copied the work of another earthly being. The court, however, held
that although the Book may have originated from these spirits,
human beings were ultimately responsible for putting it in its final
form, resulting in the necessary level of human creativity. Hence,
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Book fell
within common law copyright protection.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court, however, on
the issue of ownership of the copyright at the time of the original
publication. The trial court held that the Foundation came to
possess the plates for the Book in a serendipitous manner and,
therefore, could not show that it was the proprietor of the copyright
in the Book. The reviewing court, however, placed emphasis on
the Foundation's ability to trace its title back to the humans who
owned the original common law copyright. Since the Contact
Commission's intent to transfer ownership of the plates to the
Foundation was clear and delivery occurred, the court held that
there was also intent to transfer the copyright of the Book.
Finally, Maaherra claimed that the copyright renewal certificate
that the Foundation obtained in 1983 was invalid. She claimed that
the Book was not a work made for hire as the renewal certificate
specified and, therefore, was invalid. Maaherra claimed that
because the Foundation made an error in describing the nature of
its proprietorship, the Book became part of the public domain in
1983. The trial court did not decide this issue, but the Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument. Although it agreed with Maaherra
that the book was not a work made for hire, it held that this was not
sufficient to destroy a valid renewal of the copyright. Referring to
17 U.S.C. § 304(a), the court held that the term "proprietor" was
enough to satisfy the legal basis of the renewal claim in 1983. The
court also noted the absence of a single case in which a renewal
was held invalid because of an inadequate or inaccurate description
of the basis of the claim. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held the
Urantia Foundation had a valid copyright renewal and that
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/14
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Maaherra had infringed it. UrantiaFoundationv. Maaherra,114
F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997). ScoTT G. WARNER ET AL, Ninth Circuit
Holds Book Of "Revelations" From Non-Human SpiritualBeings
Entitled To Copyright Protection, COMPUTER LAW BULLETIN,
Volume 12 No. 4, 1997 at 158-9.

Kristen Ullom
Lisa M. Barr
T.Sean Hall
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Please complete this form and return it to:
Lawyers for the Creative Arts
213 W. Institute Place, Suite 411
Chicago, IL 60610-3125
Contributing Member $45
Patron $250

Benefactor $65
Student Member $20
(with photocopy of ID)

Sponsor $100

Name:
Firm:
Address:

Zip:_

State:

City:
Telephone: (day)

(eve)

Please send information on becoming a Volunteer Attorney.
Please send information
__ Commons@DePaul,
Published by Digital
2016on LCA's Expanded Referral Program.
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